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EC-DIRECTIVE ON CROSS-BORDER CREDIT TRANSFERS
Jac Rinkes
Introduction
On  27  January  1997, the European Parliament  and  the  (EC)
Council  adopted  Directive  97/5/EC  on  cross-border  credit
transfers1.  The Directive has a history of some seven  years.
The  purpose  of this Directive is to improve the  efficiency,
transparancy and performance of cross-border credit transfers.
Consumers and SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises)  often
encounter   difficulties  when  making   cross-border   credit
transfers.  These problems comprise opaque conditions,  double
charging,  inefficiency, high costs and unreliable indications
of  the  (maximum)  time needed for effecting  a  cross-border
transfer  order,  as well as problems regarding  liability  of
banks  in  the  event of a failure to succesfully  complete  a
credit  transfer. Furthermore, customers quite often  find  it
difficult  to  obtain  adequate  information  regarding   such
transfers2, and complaints handling schemes may be lacking.
Against   this   background,  the  Directive   should   enable
individuals  and businesses to make credit transfers  rapidly,
reliably  and  cheaply  from one  part  of  the  Community  to
another.  The  ensuing greater competition in the  market  for
cross-border credit transfers should lead to improved services
and  reduced prices. The purpose of this article is to examine
the  problems  underlying the Directive, the  history  of  the
Directive3 and the key-issues dealt with in the Directive.
Cross-border credit transfers
Problems  regarding cross-border payments have been identified
by consumer organisations as one of the principal obstacles to
bringing  into  effect  the European Single  Market.  Although
statistical  data  regarding the amount and  value  of  cross-
border payments are not available in full detail, the relative
importance of cashless payment instruments has been increasing
substantially since the eighties4. Consumers and  SMEs  use  a
variety of instruments for their cross-border payments:  face-
to-face  payments, remote payment by cheques or giro transfers
through banking channels and 'practical' solutions (sending  a
cheque, opening an account abroad).
From  the European perspective, this situation can be detrimen
tal  to  the  creation of the Single Market -  consumers  will
hesitate to buy insurance, goods, services etc, abroad as long
as  simple things such as paying may be difficult. In order to
alleviate  the  problems  faced by consumers  in  cross-border
payments the Commission published in 1990 a Recommendation5 on
the  transparency  of banking conditions  relating  to  cross-
border  financial  transactions. Despite the firm  commitments
the   Commission   made   in  this  Recommendation,   consumer
organisations found little improvement regarding  cross-border
payments in the EU. As a result, European regulation of cross-
border  payments came - again - up for discussion in Brussels.
This  resulted  in  the present Directive, to  be  implemented
before 14 August 1999. And despite opposition from the banking
industry, legislation will make it easier, cheaper and quicker
for consumers and SMEs to transfer money across borders.
Recommendation 90/109/EEC
The  objectives of the 1990 Recommendation on the transparency
of  banking  conditions  relating  to  cross-border  financial
transactions  were  set out in its recitals:  the  removal  of
economic  barriers  within  the  Community  and  the  progress
achieved in the field of banking cooperation fostered  by  the
directives  adopted under the Single European Act should  logi
cally  lead to an increase in purchases of goods and  services
in  other  Member States and to greater mobility for  individu
als,  particularly workers, tourists and pensioners. This free
movement of individuals and products will increase the  number
of cross-border financial transactions and the number of opera
tors   carrying  out  such  transactions.  The  way  in  which
international  transfer systems operate is much  more  complex
than  the  system  of national transfers (more intermediaries,
different clearing systems, different currencies and  exchange
aspects).  Those  undertaking  such  transactions  should   be
clearly informed in advance of the cost and time needed.
The Commission (in 1990) invited the Payment Systems Technical
Development Group (PSTDG) and the Payment Systems Users Liason
Group  (PSULG)  to  implement the  Recommendation.  The  PSULG
succeeded  in  introducing guidelines for  client  information
regarding  cross-border payments (which came into force  on  1
January 1993). The Commission decided to survey the results of
these guidelines, and thus the effects of the Recommendation6.
The results of this study7 revealed quite disappointing data8.
Reacting  to these results, consumer organizations  urged  the
Commission to take further steps; representatives of trade and
industry  were positive about possible improvements, but  doub
ted  the  need for a directive. Representatives of the banking
sector  stated  that the survey was not representative.  Also,
the study was considered premature because banks had only been
bound by the Code of Conduct since January 1993, and the study
was made in the first six months of 1993. The European Banking
Federation,  the European Savings Banks Group and the  Associa
tion  of  Cooperative  Banks of the  EC  were  firm  in  their
opposition9.
The Commission then promised a second study. This second study
on cross-border payments in the European Union10 again revealed
'generally  disappointing' results11, despite certain  improve
ments  since  the 1993 survey12: as to time of operation,  the
average period for the transfer was 4.79 days. A few transfers
took  a very long time; some never arrived13. The average cost
of  a  100  ecu payment amounts to 25.41 ecus with some  sharp
differences  between countries. Banks earn money  on  exchange
rates.  Even  when  the principal clearly  specified  that  he
wanted  to  pay  all costs, 36 per cent of the transfers  were
double charged14. As to consumer information and transparency,
France,  Ireland and the UK provided information in an accessi
ble  way.  Results were less satisfactory in Greece,  Portugal
and Spain. The quality of the information supplied was highest
in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, and most disappointing
in Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg.
Legal Framework Working Group
Apart  from the problems, recognised in the second survey,  an
interim-report of the Commission's Working Group on the  legal
framework for cross-border payments in the Community15 revealed
other  problem  areas and bottle-necks with respect  to  cross
border payments. These concern:
(1)  recognition   and   enforcement   of   payment    netting
     agreements16;
(2)  settlement finality, insolvency and the zero-hour-rule17;
(3)  consequences  of  revocation  (sender  finality)   of   a
     transfer (to be solved by better information about  legal
     rules and through self-regulation);
(4)  receiver  finality (how and when completion of a transfer
     occurs, and whether and when a debt is extinguished by  a
     credit transfer (discharge of liability);
(5)  responsability between banks;
(6)  responsability to customers;
(7)  right of refund ('money-back guarantee');
(8)  the time taken for the transfer; and
(9)  the problem of 'double charging'.
The Commission representatives made no secret of the fact that
for the Commission the main thrust of the work in this area is
to  provide the framework for a better, more efficient service
to  customers. Work on the inter-bank aspects may be  seen  as
the   necessary  foundation  for  such  improvements.  In  the
Commission's   view  it  would  be  undesirable   and   indeed
unrealistic to provide customers with legal rights in  respect
of  the  performance of cross-border transfers by their  banks
without  giving  those same banks enforceable  rights  against
other  banks acting in the transaction (eg intermediaries  and
correspondents  in other Member States). The findings  of  the
Legal Framework Working Group coincide with the conclusions of
a  G-10  Working  Group  on  international  banking  relations
(1992).
The Commission Action Plan
Following  up  on the results of the second survey  on  cross-
border  payments,  the  European Commission  proposed  further
initiatives (opposed by the banks18). In this respect, the Com
mission stressed the need for quick and efficient systems  for
cross-border  payments  as a major  condition  for  full  inte
gration  of  the European Market for goods and  services.  The
Commission's view is that customers should be able to transfer
money  across  borders  without  any  problems,  quickly   and
cheaply. Basically, cross-border payments should be as easy as
national  payments19.  The Commission  envisaged  a  directive
laying down the general principles securing banks' obligations
to  their commitments towards their customers for cross-border
payments, including avoidance of double charging and the  time
for  the  transfer. A draft directive was  based  on  a  first
draft, which was prepared in 199320.
Accordingly, the Commission presented a package of measures to
the  Council,  the  European Parliament, the  ECOSOC  and  the
European Monetary Institute (EMI)21. Furthermore the Commission
proposed  a  work  programme, including discussions  with  the
PSTDG  and  the  PSULG, alleviating procedures  for  reporting
cross-border transfers from balance of payment statistics  (in
order to reduce costs for banks), continuing discussions  with
all  concerned  on  the legal framework for  credit  transfers
(especially  settlement finality22), and  maintaining  contact
with  interested  parties  on the  establishment  of  linkages
between national automatic clearing houses.
Obviously,  these  measures implied full  cooperation  by  the
banks.  However,  the  EU  Banking Federation  reaffirmed  its
hostility  to  a  directive, stating that  the  operations  in
question  only  represent a small percentage  of  cross-border
transfers  in  Europe23,  and  that  a  directive   would   be
incompatible with the desire to reduce costs and the principle
of subsidiarity. Banks doubted whether consumers would benefit
at all.
The necessity of a directive on cross-border payments
The  volume of cross-border payments by consumers and SMEs  is
perhaps  not  impressive.  A  substantive  increase  of   such
payments would reveal the success of the internal market,  and
the  proposed measures could very well minimise the risk  that
the  realisation  of  the  internal  market  is  hampered   by
suppliers of (cross-border) financial services. However,  most
problems  revealed in this area have quite practical  characte
ristics.  One  could appreciate the Commission's determination
to  keep the banks to their contractual obligations; arguably,
this position could be extended to many areas and reveals  the
boundaries  set  by the absence of a European legal  framework
for  private  law.  Basically, for  small-value,  cross-border
payments, free competition on the internal market should  have
offered solutions but failed to do so.
Then,  action should be taken. Banks still wrestle with small-
value,  cross-border transfers. The main reasons  for  this  -
according  to  the  banks  - is the  absence  of  an  adequate
infrastructure   for   small-value,   cross-border   payments,
different structures of financial markets in the Member States
and  the  functioning of Central Banks. Perhaps the  'European
Central  Bank' and the introduction of a single currency  will
alleviate  these problems. Furthermore, the banks have  argued
that  the  absence  of  a  separate circuit  -  distinct  from
commercial  payment  systems - for  small-value,  cross-border
payments  may  be  of influence. Inter-company  agreements,  a
European Bank-giro institution and further cooperation between
banks, automatic clearing-houses and networks could be helpful
to   solve   the  problems  described.  Cross-border  consumer
transactions  have  been identified as  an  area  of  European
Policy  since  the three-year action plan 1990-1992,  and  has
acquired  much  attention  by  the  Commission.  In  1993  the
Commission agreed on an action plan for cross-border payments;
the problems still exist24.
Directive on cross-border credit transfers
Procedure
Further  surveys by the Commission indicated the  need  for  a
directive,  especially because self-regulation  by  the  banks
proved  to  be unsuccesful. In the end, this resulted  in  the
1993  draft directive. An amended proposal was put forward  in
199525.  The  European  Parliament  gave  its  opinion  (first
reading)  on  19 May 199526. On 18 September 1995 the  Ecofin-
Council  agreed  on  a  common position  regarding  the  draft
directive27.  In  a  Notice28, the Commission  laid  down  the
competition  aspects of the draft directive. Then  followed  a
second reading and a decision of the European Parliament29 and
decisions  of the Council (19 December 1996) and the  European
Parliament  (16  January  1997,  co-decision  procedure  under
Article 189b of the Treaty).
Purpose of the Directive
According  to  the recitals of the Directive,  the  volume  of
cross-border  payments is growing steadily  now  the  internal
market  is  in full progress, with ensuing greater  trade  and
movement of people within the Community30. Cross-border credit
transfers  account for a substantial part of  the  volume  and
value   of   cross-border  payments.  It  is   essential   for
individuals  and businesses (especially SMEs) to  be  able  to
make  credit transfers rapidly, reliably and cheaply from  one
part  of  the Community to another. Competition in the  market
for  cross-border credit transfers should be enhanced, leading
to  improved services and reduced prices. The Directive  seeks
to  follow  up  the  progress made towards completion  of  the
internal  market,  in  particular  towards  liberalisation  of
capital movements and the EMU. The provisions of the Directive
are  applicable to credit transfers in the currencies  of  the
Member States and in ecus.
The  Directive lays down rules in the area of transparency and
performance  of cross-border payments; the issues  covered  by
this  Directive  must  be  dealt with  separately  from  other
'systemic'  issues,  particularly the problems  of  settlement
finality,  under  consideration  within  the  Commission.  The
purpose  of  the  Directive is to improve cross-border  credit
transfer  services  and thus assist the EMI  in  its  task  of
promoting the efficiency of cross-border payments with a  view
to the preparation of the third stage of economic and monetary
union.  With  a  view to ensuring transparancy, the  Directive
lays  down  the  minimum  requirements  needed  to  ensure  an
adequate  level of customer information both before and  after
the  execution of a cross-border credit transfer. Furthermore,
it  should  contribute to reducing the maximum time  taken  to
execute  a  cross-border transfer (encouraging those financial
institutions which already take a very short time  to  do  so,
and   to   maintain  that  practice).  Within  two  years   of
implementation of the Directive, the Commission  will  examine
the  time-limit to be applied in the absence of  a  time-limit
being   agreed   between  the  customer  and   the   financial
institution  executing the payment. The Commision will  submit
its report to the European Parliament and the Council.
Contents of the Directive
The provisions of the Directive are applicable to cross-border
credit  transfers in the currencies of the Member  States  and
the  ecu up to the equivalent of 50.000 ecu executed by credit
institutions  (as defined in the Directive) on  the  order  of
persons  other than those institutions (Article 1). The  terms
'credit   institution',  'other  institution'  and  'financial
institution'  are defined in Article 2 of the Directive  (with
reference   to  existing  EC-legislation31);  the   expression
'institution'   means   a   credit   institution   or    other
institutions. For the purpose of Articles 6, 7 and  8  of  the
Directive  (dealing  with  time  requirements,  execution  and
refund  in the event of non-execution), branches of one credit
institution  situated in different Member States participating
in the credit transfer shall be regarded as separate instituti
ons.  An 'intermediary institution' means an institution which
participates independently of the parties in the execution  of
the cross-border credit transfer.
A  cross-border credit transfer is defined (Article 2f)  as  a
transaction  carried out on the initiative of an  'originator'
via  an institution or its branch in one Member State, with  a
view  to  making available an amount of money to a beneficiary
at  an institution or its branch in another Member State;  the
'originator'  and  the beneficiary may be  one  and  the  same
person.  An  'originator' is the natural or legal person  that
orders (an order is an unconditional instruction in any  form)
the  making of a cross-border credit transfer to a beneficiary
(the   final  recipient).  The  term  'customer'   means   the
originator  or  the beneficiary, as the context  may  require.
Furthermore, the terms 'reference interest rate' and 'date  of
acceptance' are defined (Article 2k and l).
The  Directive  lays  down  explicitly  the  transparency   of
conditions   for  cross-border  credit  transfers,  especially
regarding prior and subsequent information (Articles 3 and 4).
Prior  to the transfer, this information - in writing  or  any
other appropriate means, and in readily comprehensible form  -
shall  include at least an indication of the time  needed  for
the   subsequent  stages  of  the  transfer,  the  manner   of
calculation  of  any  commissions,  fees,  charges  and  rates
payable,  the  value  date,  if any,  complaints  and  redress
procedures,  and  indication of the reference  exchange  rates
used.   Subsequent   to   a  cross-border   credit   transfer,
information  should  be provided - unless customers  expressly
forgo   this   -   regarding  at  least  references   enabling
identification  of  the  transfer, the  original  amount,  the
amount  of  all  charges and commission fees payable  and  the
value  date,  if  any.  In case of a non-franco  payment,  the
beneficiary  shall be informed of this by his own institution.
Exchange rates used (if any) shall be notified.
The  minimum obligations of institutions in respect of  cross-
border credit transfers are laid down in Articles 5-10 of  the
Directive.  Article  5 states that for a  cross-border  credit
transfer  with  stated specifications, an institution  must  -
unless it does not wish to do business with the customer -  at
the request of the latter 'give an undertaking' concerning the
time  needed  for  execution of the  transfer  and  the  costs
thereof (excluding exchange rates).
The  originator's  institution shall execute the  cross-border
credit  transfer in question within the limit agreed with  the
originator  (Article 6). The institution shall compensate  the
originator  when  the agreed time limit is not  complied  with
(or,  in  the  absence thereof, when the funds have  not  been
credited  to the beneficiary's institution at the end  of  the
fifth banking business day following the date of acceptance of
the  order).  Compensation comprises the payment  of  interest
(calculated  by applying the reference rate of  interest)  for
the  period  of  extension of the agreed  or  applicable  time
limit. In case the non-execution within the time limits set is
attributable to an intermediary institution, that  institution
shall  be required to compensate the originator's institution.
The  beneficiary's institution shall make the funds  available
to  him  within the agreed time limit, with similar provisions
for compensation in case of delays.
The institutions concerned are obliged to execute the transfer
for  the full amount thereof unless specified otherwise by the
originator (Article 7). The beneficiary's institution may levy
charges  relating to the administration of his  account;  such
charges may not be used to avoid the obligations laid down  in
Articles  5-10  of  the  Directive. In  the  event  of  double
charging,  the  institutions are liable to credit  the  amount
(wrongly)  deducted to the customer, fully and  at  their  own
costs.
In  the  event  of non-execution of transfers the institutions
are  liable  up  to  12.500 ecu32 plus  interest  and  charges
(Article   8).  This  obligation  rests  on  the  originator's
institution, as well as intermediary institutions; the  amount
is  payable to the originator or the beneficiary, depending on
the circumstances. If the cross-border credit transfer was not
completed  because of an error or omission in the instructions
given  by  the  originator,  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the
beneficiary,  to his institution, or because of  non-execution
by   an  intermediary  institution  expressly  chosen  by  the
originator,  the  obligation  to  refund  the  amount  is  not
applicable33. However, institutions shall then endeavour as far
as  possible  to refund the amount of the transfer  (deducting
charges, interest and costs in the event).
Among  the  circumstances with which institutions involved  in
the  execution  of  a  cross-border  credit  transfer  may  be
confronted,  are  those relating to insolvency  and  to  force
majeure.  For that purpose the definition of force majeure  is
based   on  the  definition  thereof  in  the  Package  Travel
Directive34. Institutions participating in the transfer  shall
be  released from their obligations in case of force  majeure,
as   defined  (Article  9),  without  prejudice  to  Directive
91/308/EEC35.
Adequate and effective dispute settlement should be secured by
the Member States (Article 10)36.
An  adequate  solution to the problems of small-value,  cross-
border payments?
The   Directive  clearly  does  not  deal  with  all  problems
identified  in  the  area of small-value, cross-border  credit
transfers.  In  addition  to this, if  one  examines  existing
measures  and action plans put forward, the Directive contains
little  that  is  new  (if one disregards  the  limitation  of
liability,  for  that  matter). Even in the  areas  explicitly
regulated by the Directive, consumers engaging in cross-border
credit  transfers  may  still be disappointed.  The  Directive
contains  many provisions excluding liability of participating
institutions,  notably in case the customer fails  to  provide
adequate   instructions  (or  choses  the  wrong  intermediary
institution). For credit transfers between 12.500  and  50.000
ecu, national laws will determine whether customers can get  a
full  refund.  Time limits should be agreed  upon  explicitly;
otherwise,  a  period  of  five  banking  business   days   is
applicable before compensation can be obtained (and even then,
compensation  is  limited,  as mentioned  above).  Of  course,
institutions  should  provide adequate  information  regarding
applicable time limits. But customers can easily be induced to
agree  upon  extended  time  limits,  for  instance  by  costs
aspects.  The  Directive  clearly  focuses  on  the  'informed
consumer'37.
Consumer information as a panacea
The  Directive  - as with other recent Directives in the  area
of   consumer  protection  -  aims  at  improving  the   legal
protection   of  the  European  consumer,  primarily   through
improved information38.
The effectiveness of a duty of disclosure could be measured in
basically  two  ways: (1) has the behaviour of consumers  been
modified  by the disclosure, (2) have characteristics  of  the
market  changed in measurable ways. Effectiveness can  have  a
third  meaning when considering required disclosures:  (3)  is
the  disclosure  made  in a way that it is  understandable  to
consumers. Studies in this field39 all follow the 'buyer-behavi
our-model approach', in the sense that information disclosures
should have a hierarchy of effects:
(a)   first, improved awareness and comprehension, which leads
to
(b)  improved consumer attitudes, which, in turn, lead to
(c)  changes in consumer behaviour.
Uniformity  in  the method of describing the  product  or  the
service    and   its   price   undoubtedly   contributes    to
effectiveness,  but  usually  consumer  decisions  are  mainly
related to income.
In  contrast  to evidence of increased awareness of  costs,  a
majority   of   consumers   will  not   automatically   'shop'
extensively  on  the  Single Market: other  circumstances  may
prevent  this. Disclosure requirements are likely to have  the
greatest  effect  when  they  are readily  accessible,  easily
comprehensible, and useful for making direct comparisons. Only
then,  will information in the consumers' possession  lead  to
more rational and informed decision making with, consequently,
improvements in market efficiency. However, this is likely  to
occur with financially aware consumers; it may not be true  of
other  categories of consumers or, indeed, of consumers  as  a
whole.  If this is correct, there may be a need to review  the
scope of the original consumer policy objective or to consider
other,  supplementary, measures to boost consumer  utilization
of  the available information or even, to consider a different
approach  not aiming on the informed consumer but at  consumer
protection itself.
In  EU-law, measures seemingly focus quite often on disclosure
duties  in  order to strengthen the position of the  consumer.
The   well-informed  consumer  should  be  able  to  use   the
information  disclosed, by-passing the  need  for  substantive
rules  protecting the interests of the consumer. The  function
of national private law in that respect is mostly disregarded.
It  could  be  held that the European legal  systems  tend  to
develop  towards a position where statutory rules should  only
provide protection in case the social and economic position of
the  parties is imbalanced in such a way that the autonomy  of
the  parties  is  under  pressure.  From  this  position,  any
significant  improvement  of  the  information  available   to
consumers  could  make  protective legislative  measures  less
desirable. Although concepts such as 'good faith',  'Treu  und
Glauben',  'bonne  foi'  and  'rules  of  reasonableness   and
fairness' can serve to rebalance the position of consumers and
suppliers  in specific cases, a shift in the position  of  the
European  legislators in this respect could only be  supported
from  the  consumer perspective provided the effectiveness  of
disclosures is firmly established, and backed by a high  level
of  substantive legal protection. Consumers as  a  group  have
very   different  characteristics;  not  every   consumer   is
financially aware and 'globalisation and depersonalisation' of
consumer  interests could have an adverse effect on the  level
of  protection40.  Furthermore, the lack of  participation  by
consumers and their representatives in the EU-decision  making
process  could be seen as one of the weaknesses of the develop
ment of European consumer law.
Equality of bargaining positions
Traditionally, the continental law of obligations has  focused
on   the   non-professional,  providing  special   rules   for
commerþants   or  Kaufleute.  The  common  law  systems   have
originated  from the commercial perspective41. The common  law
tends,  now,  to protect non-professionals by counterbalancing
their  bargaining position. It seems that the common law holds
that  the  position of the non-professional  is  in  principle
inequal  to that of the professional counter-party, and  needs
some redressing now consumers have developed as a new interest
group. Civil law legislators tend to modify their legal  rules
systematically, introducing very detailed protective statutory
measures.  The  EU  freely navigates between  these  different
positions,  not  hampered by any elaborate framework  for  the
development of private law on the Single Market.
Bargaining  positions on the market are mainly  determined  by
power, knowledge and experience. Consumer bargaining power  is
not  yet  established  to the extent that  one  can  say  that
further protective measures are unnecessary. Knowledge depends
heavily  on  adequate  and efficient information  about  legal
rules  and  the subject matter of transactions on  the  Single
Market;  this issue is momentarily a focal point  of  European
legislation.  Consumer experience in the area of  cross-border
transactions  is  lacking. Consumers are  usually  unaware  of
their own legal rules, and knowledge on foreign law cannot  be
expected. Although reliable statistical data is not available,
the   number  of  cross-border  consumer  complaints  is   not
impressive42. Obviously, the Single Market will rapidly change
this situation.
Consumers  feel insecure as to whether they can  pursue  their
rights   in   other  countries  (unawareness  of   procedures,
information,  rules, possible language barriers).  Differences
in  national laws inhibit full use of the Single Market.  Cost
aspects  of  complaints  and  litigation  and  varying   legal
protection can invalidate any price advantages of cross-border
shopping.
In  the  area of consumer protection, both the common law  and
civil law systems (and, for that matter, also the EU) tend  to
elaborate  rules  that  (further)  differentiate  the  law  of
obligations.  In this respect, one could appreciate  that  the
inequality  of  the market parties in the field  of  knowledge
will be redressed by effective information systems. This could
be  especially useful for services. However, from  a  consumer
perspective,   the  next  step  should  be  to   uniform   and
standardise   the  justified  expectations  of  consumers   in
specific legal relationships.
Concluding remarks
The 1997 Directive on cross-border credit transfers presents a
powerful  political  and legal signal to the  banks  that  the
internal   market   is  a  reality.  One   could   doubt   the
effectiveness  of the substantive rules of the  Directive,  or
even  question  the necessity of regulation of  this  area  of
financial practice. However, if financial institutions  desire
to  benefit  from the advantages of the internal market,  they
can  hardly oppose any improvement in information and transpar
ency, even on (qua volume) 'minor' issues. The Financial Times
editorial  (20 October, 1994) stated that Europe's banks  have
lost  their  struggle  against  legislation,  but  given   the
substantial costs of small transfers and the uncertainty  over
how long a payment will take, it is hard to feel much sympathy
for  them.  Perhaps  one should, because  smaller  banks  will
probably  lose  business once new rules are  imposed.  On  the
other  hand, costs for money transfers have increased  substan
tially over the last decade, and banks were unable to come  up
with effective voluntary measures. The Commission shall report
on the application of the Directive within two years after the
date of its implementation (cf. Article 12).
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